December 19-25, 2024 | Issue 51 - CENTCOM/AFRICOM Team
Ludovica Leccese, Meghan Terry, Colin Landry, Sara Feletto
Jennifer Loy, Editor; Alice Cian, Senior Editor
Air Strike[1]
Date: December 19, 2024
Location: Yabus, Blue Nile State, Sudan
Parties involved: Sudan; Sudanese civilians; Blue Nile State aid workers; Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); paramilitary armed group Rapid Support Forces (RSF); humanitarian organizations; NGO workers; UN; World Food Program (WFP); US; USAID
The event: An aerial strike hits the WFP compound in Sudan's Blue Nile State on Thursday, killing three staff members.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
The ongoing attacks and the humanitarian aid workers’ casualties will likely delay aid distribution to food-insecure and vulnerable areas, very likely increasing malnutrition and health concerns in the region. The delay of resources arriving at camps will likely challenge NGOs to provide healthcare necessities and assistance to vulnerable populations such as the elderly, children, pregnant women, and those with underlying health conditions. The disruption to food stockpiles will very likely lead to an increase in malnutrition, likely increasing the vulnerability of those reliant on NGOs distributions and very likely widening the gap between food needs and available resources. The reduction of WFP's resources will likely escalate emergency levels of food insecurity, likely pressuring the government to request food aid and healthcare from organizations, allied countries, and the UN to reach malnourished communities.
The attack will likely increase hostilities within the state, very likely leading to a disregard for humanitarian zones and increasing risks for NGO workers in the region. The attack on aid workers will likely lead to a loss of belief in neutrality zones by the SAF and RSF, very likely increasing the risk of deliberate attacks on humanitarian facilities and workers in the area, as these zones will likely be perceived as supporting opposing factions. As both SAF and RSF increasingly engage in ground fighting to gain control of the region, NGOs will likely abandon the area due to the increasingly concerning security situation.
The deaths of aid workers will likely prompt a reevaluation of global humanitarian strategies, especially in conflict zones. International organizations like the UN and national governments involved in humanitarian efforts such as the United States, which provides humanitarian support through agencies like USAID, will likely call for stronger protections for aid workers. These measures will likely include the introduction of more robust security protocols or the creation of peacekeeping forces specifically dedicated to protecting humanitarian efforts. Security measures will likely include heavier defensive armaments, likely complicating the neutral status of aid organizations and increasing risks for their personnel as armed groups will likely consider them a threat or aligned with rivals.
Date: December 22, 2024
Location: North Darfur State, Sudan
Parties involved: Sudan; Sudanese civilians; Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); SAF-aligned armed group coalition Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements (JSAMF); paramilitary armed group Rapid Support Forces (RSF); Chad; Libya
The event: Sudan's RSF recapture the strategic al-Zurug base in North Darfur from army-allied Joint Forces.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
The recapture of the al-Zurug base will likely initiate a cycle of retaliatory attacks, with both sides likely targeting civilians. This violence will likely fuel armed group mobilization, increasing the number of localized militias and heightening the risk of unchecked cycles of revenge attacks, likely further destabilizing the region. The proliferation of armed groups will likely lead to fragmented control over Darfur, making governance and humanitarian access increasingly difficult while intensifying civilian displacement and regional insecurity.
The control of the al-Zurug military base will likely enhance the RSF's operational capabilities, likely encompassing intelligence planning, troop deployment, and resource development. The RSF will likely use the base as an operational camp to strategically push their advance toward El Fasher, likely consolidating their military positions and aiming at establishing full control over Darfur. The RSF will likely operate drones and direct airstrikes on SAF's targets and positions in Darfur from the base, likely prioritizing SAF military camps, air force bases, and airports. The recapture of the hub will likely enhance the coordination with regional allies and militias, likely expanding their arsenal and increasing their military presence, likely destabilizing the SAF’s hold on al-Fasher.
The SAF will likely continue to carry out attacks against key locations throughout the Darfur region including the al-Zurug military base, likely using airstrikes and drone capabilities to damage RSF logistics. While these efforts will likely temporarily disrupt RSF supply lines, reliance on cross-border networks with Chad and Libya will likely sustain RSF operations, likely resulting in a prolonged stalemate. Drawn-out conflict and costly aerial campaigns will likely weaken both parties’ capacities over time, risking a collapse in governance across Darfur, worsening displacement, and deepening regional instability.
[1] Air Strike 1, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)
[2] World Food Programme says three staff killed in Sudan by aerial strike, Reuters, December 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/world-food-programme-says-three-staff-killed-sudan-by-aerial-strike-2024-12-20/
[3] Sudan's RSF says seizes back control of key Darfur base from army allies, Reuters, December 2024,https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-rsf-says-seizes-back-control-key-darfur-base-army-allies-2024-12-22/