February 27- March 5, 2025 | Issue 7 - AFRICOM and EUCOM
Alexandru Boldor, Orane Desilles, Sophia Schultz, Meghan Terry, Ludovica Leccese, Miruna Moise, Giovanni Lamberti, Leon Kille
Naureen Salim, Editor; Finley Thomas, Senior Editor
In an effort to bring you the most actionable analytical information, we are combining regions in order to focus our efforts on a multitude of projects. The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) will continue to meet the challenges of the current threat environment as worldwide geopolitical shifts demand that we stay agile and flexible.
Insurgency[1]
Date: February 27, 2025
Location: Bukavu, South Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of Congo
Parties involved: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government; DRC military; Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC); Congolese Tutsi-led rebel paramilitary group, M23; local civilians; Rutshuru local community; Burundi; Burundian government; Burundian military; Burundi National Defence Force (BNDF); Rwanda; Rwandan government; Uganda; international community; East African Community (EAC); African Union (AU)
The event: Explosions left 11 dead and 65 wounded at an M23 rally in eastern Congo.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
The explosions at the M23 rally will likely escalate tensions between the rebel group and the Congolese government, likely increasing the risk of retaliatory attacks and military operations in eastern Congo. M23 will likely perceive the attack as a provocation, with a roughly even chance of the M23 increasing its offensives against government forces, likely launching attacks on key military positions, seizing supply routes, and attempting to expand its territorial control in North and South Kivu. A heavy-handed response from the Congolese military will likely alienate local communities, such as Rutshuru, likely pushing civilians to support or join armed groups out of fear or necessity.
Increased activity near the Burundi border will very likely increase the risk of encounters between the M23 and opposing groups as the conflict expands in eastern DRC. The attack will almost certainly cause displacement across South Kivu, with M23 likely exploiting evacuation routes to expand its territories. This exploitation will likely lead to further confrontations with opposing factions such as FARDC in South Kivu and BNDF along the Burundi border, likely increasing the threat of violence to civilians.
The M23 rally attack will likely deepen distrust among regional security actors, likely undermining intelligence-sharing and coordinated military efforts in eastern DRC. Burundi and Rwanda, both accused of supporting rival factions, will very likely experience heightened tensions complicating EAC and AU efforts to maintain a unified security approach. Increased suspicion between regional actors will likely cause joint security operations to become less effective, likely increasing the risk of unilateral military actions by Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda.
Date: February 27, 2025
Location: Istanbul, Turkey
Parties involved: Russia; Russian delegates; US President Donald Trump; USA; US delegates; Ukraine; NATO; EU; EU member countries adhering to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); EU treaty-based security and defense framework, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); Canada; Mexico; China
The event: Delegates met in Istanbul to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations between Russia and the US.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
Russian-US rapprochement will likely incentivize the EU to strengthen autonomous military capabilities. This rapprochement will very likely push Europe to reduce its reliance on NATO and US security guarantees, very likely prompting the EU to strengthen its military capabilities. The shift will likely require increased defense budgets and greater commitment to CSDP and PESCO. Without these measures, the EU will very likely risk long-term vulnerability, as the US will likely reallocate its military resources and reduce security commitments to European defense.
The EU's exclusion from US-Russia peace talks will likely weaken its influence on global security and the defense industry. This will very likely reduce the EU’s standing on key security issues, such as Europe’s political stability and regional conflicts while weakening its power in foreign policy. Russia and the US will very likely reach an agreement without the EU’s consent and its best interests, likely challenging European security on the Eastern front. A deal without Europe will very likely undermine the EU’s role in shaping defense and leadership strategies, likely limiting its ability to remain competitive in the international defense sector.
A potential Russia-US realignment will very likely push Europe to secure new allies in trade and defense, likely turning to other major economies, such as China. The realignment will very likely prompt the EU to sign new trade deals with countries such as Canada and Mexico, as the Trump administration’s economic decisions will very likely increase tension between the EU and the US. China will likely capitalize on the deteriorating relations between the EU and the US, very likely aiming to sign new trade deals with European countries. These initiatives will very likely reduce the EU’s dependency on the US and likely lead to further deterioration of relations between the EU and the US.
Date: March 4, 2025
Location: Belgrade, Serbia
Parties involved: Serbia; members of the Serbian ruling coalition led by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS); members of the Serbian opposition party, the Green-Left Front; Serbian Justice Department; Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime; Serbian student protesters; Serbian citizens; Serbian media company, Pink; EU; EU Parliament
The event: Opposition lawmakers threw smoke grenades inside the Serbian parliament in protest of SNS to show solidarity with student demonstrators.[4]
Analysis & Implications:
The smoke grenade incident will very likely intensify the erosion of Serbian democracy and reinforce the ruling party’s control. Pink will likely support SNS through nationalist coverage of the event as media portrayal of the Green-Left Front’s actions will very likely reduce public support for the party and allow SNS to maintain its leadership. SNS will likely use the incident to justify stricter measures, such as arresting protest organizers of anti-corruption demonstrations, very likely weakening democratic institutions and restricting political opposition.
Serbia's inaction against corruption and crackdown on protesters will likely escalate demonstrations, almost certainly increasing violence. Suppressing dissidents and failure to address corruption will likely turn political unrest into sustained civil resistance, triggering confrontations between protesters and state forces. The ruling coalition will likely restrict the political opposition after the parliament incident, very likely injecting violent agitators into peaceful protests to discredit them. The unstable political environment will very likely lead to the polarization of Serbian society and will likely accelerate the state’s shift toward authoritarianism.
Serbia's democratic challenges and widespread corruption will very likely cause an increase in anti-government efforts and an increase in government repression, almost certainly impeding its EU application. The EU parliament will almost certainly continue to reject Serbia's application, citing democratic and corruption challenges, repression, and the violent response of opposition groups. Inconsistent progress on anti-corruption measures within the justice department, public procurement, and its Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime will very likely keep fueling government repression, very likely deepening domestic dissatisfaction and exacerbating public unrest. The incident in parliament will likely signal to the EU that Serbia's governance issues extend beyond policy failures to institutional instability, likely diminishing its credibility as an EU candidate state.
[1] Insurgency, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)
[2] Blasts at M23 rally in eastern Congo kill 11, wound 65, rebel leader says, Reuters, February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/blasts-m23-rally-eastern-congo-kill-11-wound-65-rebel-leader-says-2025-02-27/
[3] Russian, U.S. diplomats meet in Istanbul to discuss normalization of embassy operations, PBS, February 2025, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russian-u-s-diplomats-meet-in-istanbul-to-discuss-normalization-of-embassy-operations
[4] Smoke grenades tossed in Serbian parliament, lawmaker suffers stroke, Reuters, March 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbian-opposition-deputies-throw-smoke-grenades-parliament-2025-03-04/