December 26, 2024- January 1, 2025 | Issue 52 - Weapons/Tactics and CENTCOM
Zara Price, Nicholas Novak, Martina Sclaverano, W/T
Alya Fathia Fitri, Elena Alice Rossetti, Editor; Naureen Salim, Senior Editor
F-15[1]
Date: December 26, 2024
Location: Yemen
Parties involved: Israel; Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); Yemen; Houthi rebels; Yemeny civiliams; international humanitarian organizations in Yemen; humanitarian workers in Yemen; UN; international shipping companies; international navies; South Africa
The event: The IDF targeted multiple Houthi sites, including military infrastructure at the Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Kanatib ports and Sanaa International Airport, killing at least six people.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
The strikes on ports like Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Kanatib will very likely escalate the security risks in the Red Sea, including threats to international shipping companies and retaliatory attacks. These strikes will very likely damage Yemeni logistical hubs and will likely prompt shipping companies to reassess risk levels. In response, the Houthis will likely target international shipping, complicating maritime logistics, likely causing costly reroutes around the Cape of Good Hope, South Africa. This escalation will very likely lead to a recalibration of international naval presence and anti-piracy operations in the region, likely aiming to secure these vital maritime lanes against Houthi threats.
The UN and other humanitarian organizations operating in Yemen will likely pressure Israel to avoid targeting civilian infrastructure and uphold civilians and humanitarian workers’ safety, likely complicating their military strategy. This international scrutiny will very likely push Israel to increase transparency regarding its targets to maintain international support, likely slowing down its operational tempo. Israel will likely allocate additional resources to communication efforts to justify its strikes in Yemen and counter international scrutiny. These constraints will very likely create operational delays, likely giving the Houthis more time to prepare or launch retaliatory attacks.
Date: December 28, 2024
Location: Bandar Lengeh, Hormozgan Province, Iran
Parties involved: Iran; Iranian authorities; Iranian national security agencies; Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); former Commander of the IRGC Quds Force Qassem Soleimani; Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (VAJA); Supreme National Security Council (SNSC); head of police intelligence; police officer; security personnel; Iranian residents; Sunni, Baloch, and Kurdish populations; Islamist extremist groups; suicide bomber; Al-Qaeda-linked Sunni Baloch militant group, Ansar al-Furqan; Pakistan; foreign intelligenceThe event: A suicide bomber killed the head of police intelligence and critically wounded another police officer[3] in an attack unofficially attributed to Ansar al-Furqan.[4]
Analysis & Implications:
Iranian national security agencies, including the IRGC, VAJA, and SNSC, will likely increase security measures, such as expanding surveillance and intelligence operations, leading to over-militarization of the community. The IRGC will very likely deploy additional security personnel, and set up new checkpoints, while VAJA will enhance electronic surveillance tools across Hormozgan Province. These actions likely aim to deter future attacks and gather actionable intelligence but will likely increase tensions between residents and authorities. This intensified SNSC security presence will very likely limit civic freedoms, deepening the prominence of security needs over civil liberties.
The success of this attack very likely sets a precedent for copycat suicide attacks in the short term, especially as the anniversary of Soleimani's death approaches in early January. Islamist extremist groups in the region will very likely target Iranian authorities on significant dates or events, likely considering the upcoming anniversary as a potent symbol to increase their attacks. They will very likely plan suicide bombings, stabbings, and shooting attacks, very likely aiming to exploit heightened tensions and large gatherings. These acts will likely polarize communities and increase the cycle of violence, very likely challenging regional peace and security efforts.
Alleged Ansar al-Furqan's responsibility will likely fuel speculation and distrust against Sunni and Balochi communities, likely exposing them to authorities' close monitoring, targeted profiling, and specific counterterrorism efforts. The IRGC will likely intensify crackdowns on minorities, likely heightening tensions between the Iranian government and marginalized communities, such as Sunni, Baloch, and Kurdish populations. Iranian security forces in the Sistan and Baluchistan province will likely focus on counterterrorism tasks, such as increasing the number of raids on suspected terrorist positions, likely diverting resources from other security priorities such as patrolling the border with Pakistan and countering foreign intelligence operations.
[1] F-15, by Pvt. Brooke Davis, licensed under Public Domain (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.)
[2] Israel strikes Houthi targets in Yemen, killing six, Reuters, December 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-yemens-sanaa-airport-ports-power-stations-2024-12-26/
[3] Suicide bomber kills police commander in southern Iran - media reports, Reuters, December 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/suicide-bomber-kills-police-commander-southern-iran-media-reports-2024-12-28/
[4] A suicide bomber kills a police officer and wounds another in southern Iran, AP, December 2024, https://apnews.com/article/iran-sunni-suicide-bomber-