March 20-26, 2025 | Issue 10 - AFRICOM and EUCOM
Ludovica Leccese, Meaghan Mackey, Orane Desilles, Leon Kille, Camilla Raffaelli, Sophia Schultz, Giovanni Lamberti, Jennifer Radlinsky
Naureen Salim, Editor; Clémence Van Damme, Senior Editor
In an effort to bring you the most actionable analytical information, we are combining regions in order to focus our efforts on a multitude of projects. The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) will continue to meet the challenges of the current threat environment as worldwide geopolitical shifts demand that we stay agile and flexible.
M23 Rebels Advancing Westward[1]
Date: March 20, 2025
Location: Walikale, North Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Parties involved: Democratic Republic of Congo; DRC government; DRC military; local civilian population; armed actors in DRC; humanitarian infrastructure in DRC; local children and pregnant women; local vulnerable populations; Congolese Tutsi-led rebel paramilitary group, M23; M23 opponents; community-based militia group, Mai-Mai; Congolese Hutu militias group, Nyatura
The event: M23 rebels pushed west in eastern Congo by taking the town of Walikale.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
M23’s presence in Walikale will likely drive civilians to flee out of fear of violence, forced recruitment, and exploitation by armed actors, very likely worsening the humanitarian crisis. This displacement will likely push many people into remote areas with limited access to essential services, likely creating concentrated zones of vulnerability where humanitarian infrastructure becomes increasingly overwhelmed. The acute resource scarcity in these remote zones will likely worsen, triggering shortages of food, clean water, and medical care, very likely increasing the risk of disease outbreaks and malnutrition, particularly among children and pregnant women. There is a roughly even chance that limited humanitarian access in these remote zones will further isolate vulnerable populations, compounding the long-term health and protection crisis.
By pushing westwards towards the capital, M23 will very likely try to take control of critical mineral-rich towns on its way, such as the Bisie mining site, to finance its activities and future offensives in the DRC. This move will very likely stem from a growing need to secure a continuous and independent stream of revenue, likely enabling M23 to increase recruitment and strengthen control over key transport routes and logistical corridors used to move weapons, fighters, and supplies. With greater financial resources, M23 will very likely invest in advanced weaponry such as electronic warfare jammers and drone capabilities, likely limiting opponents' offensive and defensive targeting capabilities both on the ground and in the air. This strengthened military capacity, combined with secure supply lines, will very likely enhance M23’s operational flexibility to plan and execute more coordinated offensives, likely sustaining pressure on both military and civilian targets without the constraints of resource shortages.
M23’s occupation of Walikale will likely deepen long-standing public distrust in the Congolese state, especially in areas where communities already perceive the government as absent or complicit. The occupation will likely reinforce the held belief that the government prioritizes central power over peripheral regions, likely abandoning local populations to armed groups rather than providing the necessary protection or intervention. With the state’s inability to assert control, local populations are likely to increasingly turn to armed groups such as the Mai-Mai or Nyatura, who have filled the security void, likely offering protection but also informal justice and resources the state has failed to provide. This shift will likely embed these groups deeper into the region’s social and political systems, likely challenging the government's authority and solidifying their role as the primary actors in local governance, making it more difficult for the state to restore legitimacy or reassert control.
Date: March 24, 2025
Location: Europe
Parties involved: World Health Organization (WHO); international health bodies; EU; European states; European governments; European healthcare systems; European medical infrastructure; ethnic communities in Europe; TB-infected people in Europe; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC); European migrants; Ukraine; Ukrainian military; Ukrainian military personnel; Ukrainian military family; TB-infected Ukrainian soldiers; anti-government threat actors; pro-Russian individuals; Moldova
The event: The WHO warned that childhood tuberculosis (TB) cases have increased by 10% in its European region.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
A rise in childhood tuberculosis will very likely strain European healthcare systems, likely overwhelming existing medical infrastructure and creating challenges that undermine public health responses. This initial strain will almost certainly exacerbate vaccine shortages, as healthcare resources become diverted to managing immediate TB cases, likely reducing the capacity to implement comprehensive preventative measures. The resulting gaps in preventive care will very likely accelerate the transmission of tuberculosis, particularly among vulnerable pediatric populations with weakened immune systems and limited access to early diagnostics. These mounting transmission risks will very likely create regional hotspots of infection, where overwhelmed local health systems struggle to contain the spread, with a roughly even chance of transforming isolated outbreaks into broader epidemiological challenges.
An increase in childhood TB in Europe, particularly in conflict zones such as Ukraine, has a roughly even chance of affecting military personnel through family interactions, very likely reducing operational readiness. Overcrowded living conditions and limited healthcare infrastructure in field deployments will very likely accelerate TB transmission among military personnel. This heightened exposure will likely make preventive measures critical, yet the lack of targeted vaccination programs for military personnel will very likely exacerbate the situation by increasing TB cases, likely weakening the military's ability to function effectively in high-risk areas. TB-infected soldiers will very likely require extended medical treatment, likely leading to a significant reduction in troop availability and straining Ukraine’s military resources.
European countries with high TB infection rates, such as Moldova, will very likely become targets of disinformation around the published TB data, as threat actors will likely leverage the public health crisis to push forward self-serving narratives. Anti-government threat actors, such as pro-Russia individuals, will likely spread false claims about TB origins or government cover-ups, likely to erode public trust in healthcare institutions and international health bodies such as the WHO or ECDC. They will also likely spread disinformation about TB outbreaks being caused by migrants or specific ethnic communities, almost certainly reinforcing grievances between different population groups while amplifying xenophobic sentiments. Such discourse will likely deter infected individuals from seeking testing and treatment, create vaccine hesitancy, and public resistance to containment measures, likely requiring infection-prone countries to counter with fact-checking and community-based health literacy programs in response.
Date: March 26, 2025
Location: South Sudan
Parties involved: South Sudan; South Sudan Vice President, Riek Machar; South Sudanese security forces; government opposition forces; South Sudanese civilians; internally displaced persons (IDPs) in South Sudan; humanitarian organizations in South Sudan; South Sudanese ruling party, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM); SPLM political opponents; South Sudanese centre-left political party and rebel group, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO); South Sudanese voters; South Sudanese armed opposition group, National Salvation Front (NAS); Nilotic ethnic group in South Sudan's Greater Upper Nile region, Nuer; Nuer militias; Nuer militant organization, White Army; Nuer rival communities; UN
The event: South Sudanese security forces arrested Machar, raising concerns from the UN of renewed conflict in the country.[4]
Analysis & Implications:
Machar’s detention will likely delay preparations for the December 2026 Sudanese elections by undermining the legitimacy of the electoral process. His exclusion from the race is likely to signal that the ruling party, the SPLM, is eliminating political opponents rather than allowing fair competition, reinforcing the perception that it consolidates power through coercion rather than consensus. The ruling party’s control over the process will likely reinforce suspicions that those in power have predetermined the outcome, discouraging voter participation and making opposition groups and civil society more likely to reject the results outright. This growing frustration and sense of disenfranchisement will very likely increase the potential for post-election unrest and prolonged political instability.
Machar’s detention is likely to catalyze increased local mobilization among opposition forces, likely resulting in a resurgence of violent resistance in South Sudan’s key conflict zones. The SPLM-IO’s supporters, including Nuer militias such as the White Army, are likely to view Machar’s arrest as a direct attack on their political and military movement, fueling their grievances and very likely prompting armed resistance. These militias, which have historically responded to perceived threats to Nuer leadership with swift and violent action, will likely initiate raids against government forces and rival communities, very likely undermining any remaining stability in contested regions. As these actions intensify, there is a roughly even chance of militias forming alliances with other armed opposition groups, such as NAS in Equatoria, leading to a broader insurgency.
Any potential violence caused by Machar’s arrest will very likely exacerbate South Sudan’s internal displacement crisis by forcing civilians to flee renewed fighting between government and opposition forces. This will likely result in an increased flow of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in South Sudan, very likely putting additional pressure on already overcrowded displacement camps and depleting limited resources such as food, water, and medical supplies. The increase of Sudanese IDPs will likely create extra competition for these stretched resources, likely making it harder to meet the needs of both new arrivals and the existing displaced population. As these resources become scarcer, humanitarian organizations will very likely encounter difficulties in providing timely assistance, with delays in aid distribution and logistical challenges exacerbated by growing insecurity.
[1] Rebels seizing a town in DRC, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)
[2] Congo rebels dismiss ceasefire calls, capture strategic town, Reuters, March 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congos-m23-rebels-enter-walikale-town-centre-extending-westward-push-2025-03-20/
[3] Childhood tuberculosis cases rise by 10%: a disturbing wake-up call for European Region, WHO, March 2025, https://www.who.int/europe/news/item/24-03-2025-childhood-tuberculosis-cases-rise-by-10-a-disturbing-wake-up-call-for-european-region
[4] Arrest Of Vice President Puts S.Sudan On 'Brink Of Conflict': UN, Barron’s, March 2025, https://www.barrons.com/news/arrest-of-vice-president-puts-s-sudan-on-brink-of-conflict-un-0b1c67d6?refsec=topics_afp-news