PSA: AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AND IRAN UNDER THREAT OF FORCIBLE REPATRIATION; COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE NEEDED

Jacqueline Heier, Ananya Das, Vitaliy Nabukhotny, WATCH/GSOC Team

Archie Archie, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor

April 20, 2025

Stop Deportation[1]

Introduction

In March 2025, Pakistan reimplemented its Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan (IFRP), forcibly repatriating almost a million Afghan nationals, including registered refugees and asylum seekers.[2] Around six million Afghan refugees live in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.[3] Pakistani and Iranian authorities are increasingly violating the rights and freedoms of Afghan refugees, including forcible repatriation, arbitrary detention, and ill-treatment.[4] Pakistani authorities have carried out widespread arrests, assaults, and looting of Afghan-owned properties during the deportation process, often lacking legal justification.[5] Afghan returnees, many of whom fled persecution by the Taliban, now face extreme humanitarian conditions without shelter, food, or access to basic amenities such as healthcare, education, and employment.[6] The Taliban government threatens deported Afghan nationals, especially women, children, and minority groups, with persecution and exploitation upon their return to Afghanistan. The Taliban will very likely persecute Afghan returnees, particularly those with perceived ties to foreign governments, international organizations, or any groups opposed to their regime. EU member states are very likely reluctant to offer asylum to Afghan refugees as right-wing politics gain influence and governments shift towards anti-immigration policies. The US will very likely continue pursuing anti-immigration policies, suspending refugee resettlement and temporary protected status (TPS) for Afghan nationals.

Summary

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at the end of 2023, over 6.4 million Afghan refugees had fled overseas after more than four decades of civil wars in Afghanistan.[7] After the Taliban retained control of Afghanistan in August 2021, their regime targeted civilians who cooperated with the multinational US-led Coalition forces, the former government, and development programs supported by international agencies, such as the World Bank and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).[8] Thousands of Afghans fled the country to neighboring states, such as Pakistan and Iran, to escape persecution and authoritarian rule.[9] Nearly 90 percent of over six million Afghan refugees have resided in Pakistan or Iran, with Iran hosting the largest portion of refugees.[10] Pakistan has a history of hosting Afghan refugees, but cross-border attacks by extremist groups like the Afghanistan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have strained bilateral relations.[11] In 2023, the Pakistani government adopted the IFRP to target Afghan nationals and promote refugee deportations.[12] The fundamental refugee law principle of non-refoulement prohibits a state from returning refugees to a country that threatens their life or freedom based on their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.[13]

By 2024, Iranian authorities deported 750,000 Afghans and announced millions of deportations for 2025,[14] citing economic and security issues, such as scaricity of food rations and alleged regular records of rapes and murders committed by refugees.[15] As of April 2025, Iranian authorities have carried out the death penalty against more Afghan nationals than any other non-Iranian group in Iranian prisons.[16] Iran restricts Afghan refugees from having the right to paid employment, education, and social security, and many refugees struggle to secure their livelihood and cover basic needs.[17] Iranian authorities restrict freedom of movement and choice of residence for Afghan nationals, banning them from living in specific “no-go areas,” which are nearly two-thirds of the Iranian territory.[18] Iranian state media and officials have spread anti-Afghan sentiment through hate speech and hate crimes, such as intimidation, physical assault, xenophobia, and discrimination against Afghan nationals.[19]

Following an increase in terrorist attacks in 2024,[20] the Pakistani government adopted strict counterterrorism measures under Muhammad Sharif’s conservative Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML-N) administration.[21] Seeking to project a stronger stance against terrorism and diverging from its historic alliance with Afghanistan and past leniency towards terrorist groups like the Taliban, Pakistan began mass deportations of Afghan nationals.[22] Pakistani authorities have accused and charged refugees of terror links with TTP, claiming Afghan nationals threaten domestic security.[23] The Taliban government viewed this shift as Pakistan aligning with Western counterterrorism efforts, heightening cross-border tension.[24] Pakistan’s rank as the third-highest country in terrorism-related deaths in 2024, largely attributed to the TTP, further motivated this mass deportation campaign.[25] 

In early 2025, the Pakistani government reimplemented the IFRP, initiating large-scale deportations of undocumented Afghan nationals.[26] On January 29, 2025, the Pakistani government announced that all Afghan nationals must vacate Islamabad and Rawalpindi by March 31, 2025.[27] Pakistani authorities even targeted Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holders during this campaign.[28] According to UNHCR, more than 8,000 Afghans have been deported from Pakistan since April 1, 2025.[29] Local civilians in border provinces, such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, have reported that Pakistani police forcibly evicted Afghan families, looted their property, and denied refugees due process, including the right to present documents or access legal representation.[30] Pakistan has publicly indicated its expectation that Western countries will accept deported Afghans for third-country resettlement, while Taliban authorities claim they will reintegrate returnees, even in areas where persecution remains.[31] UNHCR operates a voluntary repatriation program, offering $375 per person to return refugees from Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan to cover transportation and initial resettlement costs in Afghanistan.[32]

In the US, the government ended temporary legal protections for thousands of Afghans in 2025, putting many at risk of deportation despite their arrival following the 2021 Taliban takeover.[33] The decision to end the TPS has affected over 14,000 Afghans residing in the US.[34] The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has determined that current conditions in Afghanistan no longer justify continued TPS coverage.[35] This decision will set Afghan nationals up for potential deportation starting on May 20, 2025.[36] Afghan refugees began receiving DHS emails in April 2025 informing them about the termination of their legal status and potential law enforcement actions if they do not self-deport from the US.[37] 

Canada, Australia, Norway, and Sweden received a large number of Afghan refugees in recent years and are among the countries actively implementing refugee protection policies.[38] Following far-right political parties' gains in recent elections in EU member states and other countries, such as the US,[39] refugees dependent on resettlement programs are increasingly fearful for their futures.[40] According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), half of Muslims in the EU face racism and discrimination in their daily life because of their religion, skin color, and ethnic or immigrant background.[41] After several terrorist attacks in Germany, including the February 13, 2025, Munich attack where a young Afghan asylum seeker injured at least 30 people,[42] European countries seek to deport Afghan nationals under the current border protection regulations.[43] The EU plans to deport rejected asylum seekers and create so-called return hubs in third states, such as Albania.[44] These parallel deportation trends have significantly limited the resettlement options available for the deported Afghan nationals. Central Asia states, such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are not primary destinations for Afghan refugees because of the militarized borders between those states and Afghanistan and other security concerns, including the presence of ISIS-Khorasan in northern Afghanistan.[45] 

Repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran increased, despite widespread international concern over the Taliban's repression of returnees, particularly women, minority groups, and those previously linked to the Afghan government and global missions.[46] The Taliban has increased the frequency of public executions, using them to assert control and instill fear through high-profile incidents, such as the execution of four men in crowded stadiums, drawing widespread public attention.[47] The Taliban enforce repressive gender-based restrictions that bar women and girls from education, employment, healthcare, political participation, and freedom of movement without a male guardian.[48] Afghan women and girls face the threat of forced marriages from state authorities and their parents, who allegedly arrange them to protect their daughters from being forcibly married to Taliban members.[49] Taliban authorities impose extensive censorship and media restrictions, using unlawful force against journalists and media workers.[50] Many Afghan journalists now work in exile, having lost many of their colleagues who stayed in Afghanistan.[51] The Taliban persecute civil society activists and their families, including university professors, education rights activists, and women’s rights supporters.[52] UNAMA documented that Taliban authorities committed 218 extrajudicial killings, 14 enforced disappearances, more than 424 arbitrary arrests, and over 144 cases of torture and ill treatment of detainees between August 15, 2021, and June 30, 2023.[53]

Analysis 

The Pakistani and Iranian authorities will very likely expand deportation efforts of Afghan nationals, including forced repatriation. Pakistani law enforcement will almost certainly increase arbitrary detentions and continue looting the properties of Afghan nationals to pressure them to leave the country and deter future undocumented migration. Human rights abuses against repatriated refugees will almost certainly be similar to those reported by the UNAMA concerning extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and torture of former Afghan officials since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Refugees will unlikely seek refuge in Pakistan or Iran after reports of mistreatment, persecution, detainment, and executions of Afghan nationals.

Iranian authorities will very likely increasingly detain and execute Afghan refugees in prisons. Iranian courts will very likely continue to charge Afghan nationals with harsh criminal charges, including the death penalty for drug offenses and financial corruption, as part of broader efforts to control marginalized populations and ethnic minorities. Iranian prosecutions are very likely to lack transparency, and authorities will almost certainly deny many refugees access to legal counsel. Afghan nationals, including refugees, will almost certainly remain the largest group of non-Iranian executions taking place in Iranian prisons, as they are likely disproportionately targeted by Iran's laws and denied adequate legal representation. The Iranian government will likely use these measures to deter irregular migration, deflect domestic unrest, and reinforce its authority in economically strained regions.

Iranian restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement and choice of residence will almost certainly isolate Afghan nationals in overcrowded, underserved regions, very likely limiting their access to essential services such as education, healthcare, and employment. This climate of exclusion will very likely contribute to long-term psychological trauma and social alienation among Afghan refugees, particularly children and youth who grow up in environments marked by hostility and instability. The restriction of movement and residency rights will very likely prevent Afghans from forming stable livelihoods, pressuring many into informal labor markets where they likely face exploitation. These policies will likely intensify tensions between host communities and Afghan populations, as competition over scarce resources will almost certainly grow in the limited areas where Afghans are permitted to reside. Over time, the systematic marginalization of Afghan nationals will very likely undermine regional stability, as disenfranchised groups will likely become more vulnerable to recruitment by criminal or extremist networks seeking to exploit their grievances.

Pakistani deportations of Afghan nationals almost certainly intensified in response to rising terrorism, likely serving as a diplomatic warning to ask the Taliban to strongly act against militants. Pakistan is very likely seeking to present itself as a committed counterterrorism actor to enhance its influence in regional diplomacy and international forums. The international community will likely condemn Pakistan's use of vulnerable refugee populations as leverage against the Taliban and its violation of international norms, including the non-refoulement principle. This approach will very likely strain Pakistan’s relations with human rights organizations, which will almost certainly criticize the country for violating international refugee protections. Pakistan’s repatriation efforts will unlikely deter the Taliban from supporting militant groups like the TTP in the long term, as they likely prioritize alliance with militant groups over responding to international pressure. As a result, Pakistan will likely continue to use deportations as a diplomatic tactic, but it will very likely have limited success in compelling substantive changes in Taliban behavior.

The Pakistani government’s framing of Afghan deportees as security threats or criminals will likely challenge their long-term prospects for protection, resettlement, and reintegration in third countries such as the US, UK, and countries in the EU. Pakistan is very likely strategically forming a negative narrative that will likely complicate third-country resettlement opportunities for Afghan refugees, particularly in the US and Germany. These states will very likely heighten security vetting to screen out individuals with extremist ties. While authorities will very likely apply such vetting as a legitimate measure with transparency and in line with human rights standards, the perception of militant affiliation will likely lead to overly cautious and politically influenced asylum decisions. Pakistani authorities almost certainly depict Afghan refugees as illegal foreigners with terrorist linkages to justify mass deportations and shape a narrative that will very likely cast doubt on the legitimacy of Afghan asylum claims. Afghan refugees will very likely face increased rejections or prolonged delays in third-country resettlement efforts, as host countries will likely intensify security screenings in response to negative portrayals linking Afghan nationals to criminality or extremism. There is a roughly even chance that the portrayal of Afghan refugees as security threats will discourage international donors and host states' willingness to intervene, likely out of fear of political backlash or accusations of security risks.

Afghan refugees will very likely face obstacles, such as harsh border and asylum policies, in their efforts to relocate to Western countries that are almost certainly increasingly tightening immigration controls in response to anti-immigration trends and security concerns. US authorities will likely continue implementing generalized vetting processes and stricter eligibility restrictions, very likely reducing access for deported Afghans to take refuge in the US. The US government will likely prioritize resource management and border security over humanitarian obligations of providing Afghan resettlement opportunities. The US will likely rely on regional containment of the deportees, encouraging Afghanistan to absorb the deported nationals. The dispute between regional countries expecting third-country resettlement and third countries expecting regional absorption will likely worsen the humanitarian conditions for the Afghan nationals. The DHS’s decision to terminate TPS for Afghans in the US will likely reduce legal avenues for protection and increase vulnerability among the deportees.

The US and EU member states, including Germany, Italy, and France, will very likely be reluctant to host refugees due to the recent political shift to conservative values and focus on anti-immigration policies. As these states will very likely increasingly focus on nationalist and anti-immigration policies, they will very likely reduce their refugee quota. This will almost certainly disrupt resettlement plans and very likely leave refugees in prolonged uncertainty. Conservative political parties in European states, such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, Brothers of Italy (FdI) in Italy, and the National Rally (RN) in France, will likely increase domestic repatriation plans to curb migration and appeal to nationalist sentiments. These states will likely advocate for stricter controls on asylum seekers through the implementation of the EU Migration Pact, including measures such as the creation of return hubs where refugees and undocumented migrants can be processed and sent back to their home countries. Previous terrorist attacks involving Afghan refugees in the EU will very likely encourage far-right politicians to promote repatriation plans from Germany, Italy, and France to Afghanistan. Refugees who remain in European host states will very likely face social challenges, such as employment disadvantages, lack of access to social benefits, and religious discrimination, as rising anti-immigrant sentiment and restrictive integration policies very likely limit opportunities for inclusion and support. The number of asylum requests from Afghan nationals to countries actively implementing refugee protection policies, such as Canada, Australia, Norway, and Sweden, will likely increase. The increased demand from asylum seekers will likely push these states to reconsider their policies and reduce quotas. Afghan nationals in Afghanistan will likely resort to desperate measures, including illegal border crossing, to seek asylum in other regional states, such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

Pakistani and Iranian forced repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan will very likely lead to them facing abuses from Taliban authorities, including arbitrary arrests, torture, and persecution, especially those who worked with Coalition forces and international agencies before 2021. The Taliban’s restrictions on foreign access to refugee camps in Afghanistan very likely prevent international monitoring bodies and human rights organizations, such as UNHCR and Human Rights Watch, from providing independent oversight. Taliban authorities will very likely use campsites as strategic hubs to monitor repatriated individuals and strictly enforce their interpretation of Sharia law by deploying security personnel to surveil daily activities, restricting movement, and punishing perceived violations of their ideological code. The government will very likely resettle deportees in provinces such as Kabul, Kandahar, or Herat, as the Taliban likely seeks to assert greater control over these provinces that hold political, economic, or strategic influence. They almost certainly continue to target individuals formerly associated with the Afghan government and global initiatives as they view these individuals as threats to Taliban authority. Afghan authorities will very likely continue to oppress repatriated nationals and deny them economic and social opportunities, such as access to employment, education, healthcare, and housing. Returnees, especially those the Taliban perceive as linked to the former Afghan government, international organizations, or Western states, are very likely at risk of surveillance, harassment, arbitrary detention, and physical abuse. As mass deportations continue, the lack of protection and reintegration support will very likely deepen returnees’ marginalization and suffering. This pattern of systemic neglect and abuse of human rights will likely lead to the erosion of refugees' trust in the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and will likely make them vulnerable to extremist groups’ exploitation.

There is a roughly even chance that repatriated Afghan refugees will adopt extremist views out of means of survival, for better living conditions, and offers of financial incentives and protection. Militant groups such as  TTP and the ISIS-Khorasan will very likely exploit feelings of injustice and hopelessness to recruit repatriated nationals who very likely face prolonged economic desperation, persecution, and social exclusion. TTP and other extremist groups will likely target refugees in recruitment campaigns through offers of protection, such as promises of haven and monetary support, in return for their involvement in militant operations or loyalty. There is a roughly even chance that disenfranchised returnees will turn to militant groups as one of the few available options to improve their living conditions. The absence of reintegration programs and protection services for returnees in Afghanistan likely increases the risk of radicalization among these vulnerable populations, as a lack of support very likely leaves them increasingly marginalized and susceptible to extremist groups offering financial incentives and shelter.  

Recommendations

The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) recommends that Pakistani and Iranian authorities refrain from labelling Afghan nationals as criminals or security risks without verified evidence to convict them.  They should adopt a language that aligns with international legal standards regarding the repatriation of refugees. Pakistani and Iranian authorities should recognize that the majority of Afghan deportees are searching for resettlement in third countries, and the use of criminalizing language threatens their reintegration. A neutral and rights-based narrative should facilitate humanitarian assistance and uphold Pakistan and Iran’s diplomatic credibility on the international stage.

Pakistan and Iran should improve the organization and transparency of the ongoing deportation process by collaborating with international migration support bodies, such as the IOM and UNHCR. Pakistani and Iranian authorities should prioritize voluntary repatriation in partnership with these bodies to provide support to ease the return and reintegration of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan. Pakistani and Iranian authorities should allow these agencies to monitor deportation centers, verify the nationals selected for deportation and the charges against them, and ensure family unity. Pakistan and Iran should issue deportation notices with due time and guarantee access to essential services such as food, shelter, security, and medical care throughout the process. A third-party oversight should enable adherence to international humanitarian standards in the deportation process. The Pakistani and Iranian governments should uphold the fundamental principle of non-refoulement and provide safe and dignified relocation with access to basic needs for Afghan nationals.

International humanitarian and human rights organizations, such as UNHCR, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch, should continue to advocate before the governments of EU and NATO states not to halt refugee resettlement programs. These international organizations should promote durable refugee solutions for refugees fleeing Afghanistan and expand initiatives, such as UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program to Afghanistan, to mitigate repatriation consequences for Afghan nationals. Humanitarian and human rights organizations should continue to support advocacy campaigns for Afghan refugees and fund capacity building in Central Asia to lessen asylum procedures and improve local states' ability to handle displacement.

Host states should prioritize the most vulnerable Afghan nationals, such as women and children, in accepting resettled refugees. They should streamline asylum procedures to reduce waiting times, ensure access to legal representation, and expand humanitarian visa programs. Host states should increase coordination with international organizations, such as the UNHCR and IOM, to enhance integration efforts, including employment and education assistance. This collaboration should help host states identify at-risk individuals more effectively, design targeted support programs, and ensure that resettlement efforts align with international protection standards and integration goals.

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[1] Deportation Protest Sign, generated by a third party database

[2] Pakistan: Opaque 'Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan' targeting Afghan refugees must be withdrawn, Amnesty International, March 2025,https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/opaque-illegal-foreigners-repatriation-plan-targeting-afghan-refugees-must-be-withdrawn/ 

[3] One of the World’s Largest Refugee Populations, Afghans Have Faced Increasing Restrictions in Iran, Migration Policy Institute (MPI), January 2025, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghan-refugees-iran 

[4] Afghan Refugees’ property looted and expelled with abuse in Pakistan: Officials, Khaama Press, April 2025, https://www.khaama.com/afghan-refugees-property-looted-and-expelled-with-abuse-in-pakistan-officials/  

[5] Afghan Refugees’ property looted and expelled with abuse in Pakistan: Officials, Khaama Press, April 2025, https://www.khaama.com/afghan-refugees-property-looted-and-expelled-with-abuse-in-pakistan-officials/ 

[6] Hundreds Of Thousands Of Afghans In Pakistan Brace For Deportations, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), March 2025,

https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-refugees-pakistan--deportation-unhcr/33363309.html 

[7] Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), July 2024, https://www.unrefugees.org/news/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-explained/ 

[8] What’s Next for Afghans Fleeing the Taliban?, Human Rights Watch, September 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/09/whats-next-afghans-fleeing-taliban 

[9] Ibid

[10] One of the World’s Largest Refugee Populations, Afghans Have Faced Increasing Restrictions in Iran, Migration Policy Institute (MPI), January 2025, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghan-refugees-iran 

[11] Pakistan to deport 1.1 million Afghan refugees, Khaama Press, October 2023, https://www.khaama.com/pakistan-to-deport-1-1-million-afghan-refugees/ 

[12] Pakistan: Opaque ‘Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan’ targeting Afghan refugees must be withdrawn, Amnesty International, March 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/opaque-illegal-foreigners-repatriation-plan-targeting-afghan-refugees-must-be-withdrawn/ 

[13] Article 33 of the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, UN, July 1951, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-relating-status-refugees 

[14] One of the World’s Largest Refugee Populations, Afghans Have Faced Increasing Restrictions in Iran, Migration Policy Institute , January 2025, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghan-refugees-iran 

[15] Iran plans to deport 2 million Afghan refugees, DW, September 2024,https://www.dw.com/en/iran-plans-to-deport-2-million-afghan-refugees/a-70201549 

[16] Rise in executions of Afghan nationals in Iran sparks concern, Khaama Press, April 2025, https://www.khaama.com/rise-in-executions-of-afghan-nationals-in-iran-sparks-concern/ 

[17] One of the World’s Largest Refugee Populations, Afghans Have Faced Increasing Restrictions in Iran, Migration Policy Institute, January 2025, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghan-refugees-iran

[18] Ibid

[19] Iran 2023, Amnesty International, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east/iran/report-iran/ 

[20]Pakistan asks illegal foreigners, Afghan Citizen Card holders to leave by March 31, Reuters, March 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-asks-illegal-foreigners-afghan-citizen-card-holders-leave-by-march-31-2025-03-07/ 

[21] Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Efforts Could Ignite Wider Conflict in the Region, Foreign Military Studies Office , April 2025,https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2025/pakistans-counterterrorism-efforts-could-ignite-wider-conflict-in-the-region/ 

[22] Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Efforts Could Ignite Wider Conflict in the Region, Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2025,https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2025/pakistans-counterterrorism-efforts-could-ignite-wider-conflict-in-the-region/ 

[23] Pakistan: Opaque 'Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan' targeting Afghan refugees must be withdrawn, Amnesty International, March 2025,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/opaque-illegal-foreigners-repatriation-plan-targeting-afghan-refugees-must-be-withdrawn/ 

[24] Ibid

[25] Terrorism Spreads as Lone Wolf Attacks Dominate the West, Global Terrorism Index, March 2025https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GTI-Media-Release-030325.pdf 

[26] Hundreds Of Thousands Of Afghans In Pakistan Brace For Deportations, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 2025,

https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-refugees-pakistan--deportation-unhcr/33363309.html

[27] Pakistan: Opaque ‘Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan’ targeting Afghan refugees must be withdrawn, Amnesty International, March 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/opaque-illegal-foreigners-repatriation-plan-targeting-afghan-refugees-must-be-withdrawn/ 

[28]Pakistan asks illegal foreigners, Afghan Citizen Card holders to leave by March 31, Reuters, March 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-asks-illegal-foreigners-afghan-citizen-card-holders-leave-by-march-31-2025-03-07/ 

[29] Pakistan expels thousands of Afghan nationals in fresh drive, says UNHCR, Reuters, April 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-expels-thousands-afghan-nationals-fresh-drive-says-unhcr-2025-04-08/ 

[30] Afghan Refugees’ property looted and expelled with abuse in Pakistan: Officials, Khaama Press, April 2025, https://www.khaama.com/afghan-refugees-property-looted-and-expelled-with-abuse-in-pakistan-officials/ 

[31] Pakistan warns it may expel thousands of Afghans hoping for resettlement in the West, AP News, April 2025,https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-afghans-us-refugees-expulsions-2fa18d4e9c9e51d9820caf07713db1bb 

[32] Returning to Afghanistan, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Help Website, https://help.unhcr.org/afghanistan/support/returning-to-afghanistan/ 

[33] Thousands of Afghans in the U.S. at Risk of Deportation After Losing Legal Protection, Khaama Press, April 2025,https://www.khaama.com/afghans-at-risk-of-deportation-us-ends-legal-protection/ 

[34] Trump ends protected status for thousands of Afghans, Cameroonians, Reuters, April 2025,https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-ends-protected-status-thousands-afghans-cameroonians-2025-04-11/ 

[35] Ibid

[36] Trump administration ends temporary protected status for thousands of Afghans, NPR, April 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/04/11/g-s1-59939/trump-afghanistan-tps-kristi-noem-dhs 

[37] Afghans turn to lawyers, lawmakers for answers after letter ordered them to leave US, WRAL, April 2025, https://www.wral.com/news/local/afghan-refugees-next-steps-tps-april-2025/ 

[38] A few countries take responsibility for most of the world’s refugees, Norwegian Refugee Council, November 2020 (updated June 2023), https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/fr/a-few-countries-take-responsibility-for-most-of-the-worlds-refugees/index.html 

[39] Afghans who helped the U.S. are in dangerous limbo after Trump's order on refugees, NPR, January 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/01/27/nx-s1-5273521/trump-executive-order-refugee-afghanistan-veterans

[40] Europe's far-right gains raise migrant fears for future, DW, November 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/as-europe-shifts-toward-far-right-migrants-fear-for-their-futures/a-69335566 

[41] Muslims in Europe face ever more racism and discrimination, EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, October 2024, https://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2024/muslims-europe-face-ever-more-racism-and-discrimination 

[42] Dozens injured in suspected car-ramming attack in Munich, BBC, February 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czdl6594835o 

[43] Germany's incoming government agrees to get tougher on illegal migration, Reuters, April 2025,https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-incoming-government-agrees-get-tougher-illegal-migration-2025-04-09/ 

[44] EU plans to deport more migrants, create 'return hubs,' DW, March 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/eu-plans-to-deport-more-migrants-create-return-hubs/a-71893769 

[45] Displaced Afghans in Central Asia: Barriers, Risks and Future Prospects, International Centre for Migration Policy Development , May 2024, https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/61766/file/2024-05-02_Policy_Brief_EN_web.pdf 

[46] Pakistan: Forced Returns Expose Afghans to Persecution, Destitution, Human Rights Watch, March 2025,https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/19/pakistan-forced-returns-expose-afghans-persecution-destitution 

[47] In Afghanistan, four men publicly executed in crowded stadiums, Le Monde, April 2025,https://www.lemonde.fr/en/afghanistan/article/2025/04/11/in-afghanistan-four-men-publicly-executed-in-crowded-stadiums_6740108_218.html 

[48] What are the Taliban's restrictions on Afghan women?, Reuters, January 2025,https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-are-talibans-curbs-afghan-women-2025-01-23/ 

[49] Afghans Increasingly Marrying Off Young Daughters To Avoid Forced Unions With Taliban, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-early-marriage-avoid-taliban/32157525.html 

[50] Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/afghanistan 

[51] Afghan journalists in exile start a new life in France, France 24, August 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220812-afghan-journalists-in-exile-start-a-new-life-in-france 

[52] Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/afghanistan 

[53] Afghanistan’s Taliban responsible for revenge killings, torture of former officials, UN News, August 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139962