September 26 - October 2, 2024 | Issue 39 - CENTCOM/AFRICOM
Colin Landry, Meghan Terry
Alice Cian, Editor; Brantley Williams, Senior Editor
Sudanese Armed Forces[1]
Date: September 26, 2024
Location: Khartoum, Sudan
Parties involved: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); Sudanese paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF); Sudanese militia group Janjaweed; Sudanese civilians
The event: The SAF has launched a military operation in Khartoum to recapture territory from the RSF. The operation targeted strategic areas within Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman that have been under RSF control since the start of the conflict 17 months ago.[2] The SAF’s military advance, which included heavy bombardments in civilian areas like Halfaya and Shambat, met strong resistance from the RSF.[3] The RSF has claimed to prevent SAF advancement by blocking two strategic bridges into Khartoum.[4]
Analysis & Implications:
The SAF’s military operations in urban areas throughout Sudan, such as Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman, will likely strain Sudan’s healthcare system. Medical facilities will likely be destroyed or damaged by airstrikes, almost certainly reducing access to essential services like medical care, clean water, and sanitation. The ongoing conflict and targeted attacks on healthcare infrastructures will likely displace medical staff and disrupt the supply of critical resources such as medicine and electricity. The breakdown in healthcare services will likely increase the spread of preventable diseases, heightening the risks for vulnerable populations and exacerbating the overall humanitarian crisis.
Local Sudanese militant groups, including the RSF, will likely aim to consolidate power as the central government weakens, such as by controlling key resources, security operations, and making local governance decisions. The weakening of Sudan's central government will likely result in fragmented governance, with regions controlled by competing factions and social cohesion weakening as communities align along local or ethnic loyalties. The RSF will likely refrain from returning to a centralized government once entrenched in controlling resources and regional authority, likely complicating post-conflict state-building and reconciliation.
The RSF and affiliated militias, such as the Janjaweed, will likely continue committing human rights abuses against civilians in Sudan. Due to a lack of civilian protection and oversight as the fighting intensifies, these Sudanese militias will likely subject women to sexual violence, recruit children for labor, and force military service. The repeated human rights violations will very likely have a severe physical and psychological impact on civilians due to the lack of enforceability of humanitarian law, likely leading to no retribution for any damages to the population. Widespread violations will likely erode social trust among Sudanese civilians as the population will likely lose faith in both local leadership and any future central authority.
Date: September 28, 2024
Location: Mogadishu, Somalia
Parties involved: Somalia; Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud; Somali government; Somali civilians; Islamic militant group, al Shabaab
The event: The killing of at least five people and injuries of seven others occurred from a bomb explosion in Mogadishu, Somalia. A vehicle rigged with explosives detonated in the Hamarweyne district. The explosion occurred about one kilometer from President Mohamud’s office, causing significant damage. While no group has claimed responsibility, it is suspected to be al Shabaab due to its history of similar attacks in the region.[5]
Analysis & Implications:
The bombing in Mogadishu will very likely reveal intelligence gaps in state surveillance and threat detection within the Somali government. By capitalizing on these intelligence shortfalls, militants will very likely aim to expose the government's vulnerabilities, projecting an image of a state unable to secure its most important assets, such as its intelligence infrastructure. This exposure will likely undermine public and international confidence in the government's control over vital urban centers.
The attack will likely impact local businesses, particularly in urban areas, as consumers will unlikely venture to stores, given the perceived likelihood of attacks. There is a roughly even chance that domestic and foreign investors will remove themselves from the Somali market. Sectors like food, where instability disrupts supply chains and market access, making it difficult to maintain consistent operations. These economic pressures will likely deepen public dissatisfaction, as citizens will likely hold the government accountable for failing to stabilize the economy and ensure access to basic necessities.
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[1] Sudanese Armed Forces, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)
[2] Sudan's army launches push to retake ground in capital, Reuters, September 2024,
[3] Sudan army launches major attack on capital Khartoum, BBC , September 2024,
[4] Sudan's army launches push to retake ground in capital, Reuters, September 2024,
[5] At least six killed by bomb blasts in Somalia, Reuters, September 2024,