February 6-12, 2025 | Issue 4 - AFRICOM and EUCOM
Camilla Raffaelli, Leon Kille, Ludovica Leccese, Martina Elena Nitti
Sakura Morales Furuta, Angelina Sammarco, Editors; Clémence Van Damme, Senior Editor
Court Proceedings[1]
Date: February 6, 2025
Location: The Hague, Netherlands
Parties involved: EU; European regional organizations; Hungary; Italy; US; US allies; Israel; intergovernmental organization and tribunal, International Criminal Court (ICC); ICC Chief Prosecutor, Karim Ahmad Khan; ICC officials; civilians from countries where travel bans apply.
The event: US sanctions against ICC officials have sparked divisions within the EU.[2]Â
Analysis & Implications:
The decision to impose sanctions on the ICC, very likely an attempt to delegitimize its authority internationally, will likely require parties to the organization to reassess their political and diplomatic alignments. Countries will very likely need to choose between their diplomatic relations with the US and their commitment to the ICC, likely deepening divisions on the safeguarding of human rights as states such as Hungary and Italy refrain from openly supporting the same organization they are party to. As this ideological and strategic division grows, regional organizations, such as the EU, will likely risk losing their cohesive stances on key global issues such as conflict resolution, migration policy, and global security cooperation, likely undermining their ability to promote democratic values and international justice on the world stage.
US sanctions against ICC officials will likely increase security risks for affected court personnel. Sanctioned ICC officials, such as Khan, will almost certainly continue fulfilling their duties under the Statute despite US asset freezes and travel bans, very likely exposing them to hostile parties critical of the ICC. Hostile parties to the ICC, like the US and some of its allies, such as Israel, will likely issue arrest warrants, likely restricting the ability of court personnel to conduct safe and independent, on-the-ground investigations into crimes against humanity in locations where travel bans applied. To mitigate these risks, ICC officials will almost certainly rely more on remote evidence gathering to document offenses against civilians, likely weakening the credibility and effectiveness of their findings.
Date: February 9, 2025
Location: Khartoum, Sudan
Parties involved: Sudan; Sudanese government; Sudanese military; official national military, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); paramilitary group, Rapid Support Forces (RSF); Sudanese civilian political groups; Sudanese civilians officials; Sudanese civilians; Sudanese rival factions; Sudanese protestors; Sudanese refugees; Sudanese armed groups; political inclusion porgrams in Sudan; South Sudan; Ethiopia; Chad; Western countries; international institutions; UN; African Union (AU)
The event: After regaining control of Khartoum, Sudan’s military announced plans to form a new government.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
Without sufficient civilian participation in decision-making processes, the military’s continued monopoly on Sudan’s governance will very likely deepen political divisions, likely leading to the formation of rival factions. By consolidating power and excluding civilian political groups, the military will likely provoke opposition movements, deepening the divide between military-backed forces and civilian-led groups. As both factions strive for territorial and institutional control, rival militias backing each side will likely engage in sustained guerrilla warfare and disrupt infrastructure, likely undermining state authority and deepening civil conflict.  Rival factions vying for political legitimacy and resource control will likely rely on increasingly covert forms of foreign involvement, such as financial backing and weapons shipments, likely entrenching Sudan’s political fragmentation and complicating prospects for peace.
SAF’s capture of Khartoum will very likely provoke intensified RSF violence against civilians in their controlled states of Sudan, such as Darfur and Gezira, as retaliation for their loss, very likely worsening the security crisis. This retaliation will very likely involve an escalation in the cruelty of crimes against civilians and protestors, such as rape and mass killings, likely triggering increased forced displacement and driving large-scale migration to neighboring countries like South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Chad. This mass migration will very likely complicate the security crisis in Sudan by fueling ethnic violence in refugee-hosting regions, increasing armed group infiltration, and provoking harsh border crackdowns that trap civilians in conflict zones.
A SAF-controlled government will unlikely consent to a civilian power-sharing agreement, likely leading international institutions, such as the AU and the UN, to demand SAF’s concession to include civilians as a precondition to recognize their political authority. The AU will very likely pressure the new SAF government to commit to a future transition process likely in exchange for a lift on Sudan’s membership suspension; while Western countries will likely link the provision of non-lifesaving aid to political inclusion programs. There is a roughly even chance international pressure will prompt the SAF-controlled government to include a transition to civilian rule in the future Sudan constitution and to appoint some civilian officials as a bargaining chip or a facade move, but a full transition of power remains unlikely.
[1] JA office upholds military justice, by Airman 1st Class Aspen Reid, licensed under Public Domain (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.)
[2]Â Countries vow 'unwavering' support for ICC, as Trump hits it with sanctions, Reuters, February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-impose-sanctions-international-criminal-court-2025-02-06/Â
[3]Â Sudan to form new government after regaining Khartoum, say military sources, Reuters, February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-form-new-government-after-regaining-khartoum-say-military-sources-2025-02-