September 12-18, 2024 | Issue 37 - EUCOM
Anna Leda, Anthony Krumme, Joe Everest, Leon Kille
Finley Thomas, Editor; Anya Golend-Pratt, Senior Editor
Peace Negotiations[1]
Date: September 12, 2024
Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
Parties involved: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky; Ukraine; Ukrainian military; Russian President Vladimir Putin; Russia; China; Brazil; India; United Arab Emirates (UAE); mediators in potential peace talks over Ukraine; international community; US; Western states
The event: Zelensky rejected a Chinese-Brazilian peace proposal, criticizing its exclusion of Ukraine.[2] The plan, initially offered in June 2023, envisaged an international peace conference to which Russia and Ukraine would have equal representation, aimed at ending the current conflict that escalated with a full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.[3] Zelensky stated that the proposal violates Ukrainian territorial integrity and appears “mostly pro-Russian.”[4]
Analysis & Implications:
The proposal’s limited support likely suggests that the perceived neutrality of the proposing states is insufficient for Ukraine and Western states to consider the plan. Peace proposals that don’t emphasize Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty or condemn Russian offensive action, will very likely not achieve lasting peace and are unlikely to be supported by Western states. Ukraine will likely dismiss future proposals by BRICS states, very likely due to an ongoing distrust of external mediators who appear to disregard Ukrainian sovereignty. Any peace proposals accepted by Ukraine will very likely need to formally recognize Ukraine as the primary target of Russian aggression, restore Ukrainian territorial integrity, and ensure accountability for the Russian invasion.
Perceived imbalance within the peacemaking process will very likely undermine the legitimacy and validation of any future arrangements or resolutions. Ukraine’s limited participation or exclusion in peacemaking efforts will almost certainly lead to non-adherence and their immediate rejection of the terms. It is unlikely that major global powers, including the US, and potential third-party peace mediators, such as India or the UAE, will support negotiations that lack commitment from both sides of the conflict, as such proposals may risk violating the sovereignty and autonomy of Russia and Ukraine. The international community will very likely increase diplomatic pressure on Russia and other states formulating peace proposals to engage Ukraine more inclusively and equitably in negotiations, with a roughly even chance of brokering a mutually beneficial agreement.
Date: September 16, 2024
Location: Germany
Parties involved: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz; Germany; Traffic light coalition government parties; German Federal Ministry of the Interior; German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser; German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF); German Federal Police (Bundespolizei); German citizens; German voters; German religious minorities; European right-wing, eurosceptic, and populist parties; right-wing eurosceptic populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD); EU member states; France; the Netherlands; Belgium; Luxembourg; Denmark; Austria; Poland; Czech Republic; Hungary; Italy; Switzerland
The event: Germany has implemented a stricter policy of random border control checks for the next six months along its borders with France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Denmark. The policy is part of Faeser’s newly introduced security package, aiming to tackle irregular migration and crime. It is an extension of the same controls executed on its borders with Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Switzerland since last year, posing a major logistical challenge to German police resources.[5] Under the EU Schengen code, border control checks are only allowed “temporarily” and as a “last resort” due to major security risks, raising legal, economic, and ethical concerns among other EU member states.[6]
Analysis & Implications:
The new border control measures will very likely be ineffective in impacting migration and crime, likely undermining Scholz and the Traffic Light coalition government parties’ support. The policy’s limitations will likely intensify criticism of the coalition government’s policies, likely limiting faith in Faeser’s security package, with a roughly even chance of hampering its overall success through counter-measures such as demonstrations. Discontented voters will likely interpret the border control measures as political posturing before upcoming state and federal elections, very likely increasing calls for reelection or alternative solutions to immigration and crime, such as mass deportations. Criticism of the German government will likely bolster support for right-wing parties, such as the AfD, who will very likely reinforce their anti-immigration stance and use increased border checks to validate their calls for stricter immigration measures.
The policy will very likely be unpopular among the affected EU countries bordering Germany, likely worsening intra-EU relations. Trade disruption caused by increased border checks will very likely result in deteriorating relations between Germany and other EU member states. The policy will likely undermine the concept of supremacy by some EU states, as it contradicts the spirit of EU legislation by expanding the remit of an exceptional circumstance. EU member states with incumbent or future “Eurosceptic” parties in government, such as Hungary and Italy, will likely take advantage of this new precedent to impose their own border checks or resist EU migration and asylum policy.
These measures will very likely lead to racial profiling, with authorities such as the German police and BAMF personnel disproportionately targeting individuals based on their perceived ethnicity or nationality. Increased discrimination will likely heighten tensions within Germany’s national or religious minority communities which face more frequent scrutiny. Social divisions will very likely be exacerbated, likely contributing to the alienation of migrants, further complicating integration efforts, and strengthening political extremes.
[1] USAWC distance students taught negotiation skills through exercise, by John Goulette, licensed under Public Domain. (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.)
[2] Ukraine's Zelenskiy dismisses 'destructive' China-Brazil peace initiative, Reuters, September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-zelenskiy-dismisses-destructive-china-brazil-peace-initiative-2024-09-12/
[3] Ibid
[4] Zelenskiy Calls Chinese-Brazilian Peace Plan Proposal 'Destructive', Radio Free Europe, September 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/zelenskiy-calls-chinese-brazilian-peace-plan-proposal-destructive-/33117350.html
[5] Germany begins conducting checks at all its land borders, AP News, September 2024, https://apnews.com/article/germany-border-checks-16d0899b956e6c3b363f12268c8e4969
[6] Doubts about the feasibility of border controls, Tagesschau, September 2024,
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/grenzkontrollen-polizei-faeser-100.html (Translated by Google)
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